Economists commonly appeal to sovereign powers to explain the acceptance of unbacked paper money at a positive value. The government accepts or compels taxes to be paid in the money (makes it publicly receivable) or compels creditors to accept it (grants and enforces legal tender status). Thus fiat money is thought to rely on enforcement of a literal fiat or decree. The case of Somalia defies such an account. Following the state's collapse in 1991, unbacked paper Somali shillings continued to circulate at a positive value. We explain how historical acceptance, or "inertia," can sustain the ongoing acceptance of unbacked money even in the absence of ongoing sovereign support. Although sovereign power might be necessary to launch a fiat standard, we conclude that it is not a necessary condition for its survival.
Ordinary supply-and-demand theory explains the positive value of historical commodity monies such as gold, silver, or salt. Something more is required to explain the positive value of the non-commodity or fiat monies of the present day. Why do transactors place a positive value on paper notes that are useless for any non-monetary purpose and cannot be redeemed for any useful commodity? To say that they value the notes for their use as a medium of exchange is to beg the question: the notes must have a positive value to be useful as a medium of exchange.
Economists commonly invoke sovereign support to explain the positive demand price of fiat money. Given that a "fiat" is a decree, the very label fiat money implies that its monetary character derives from sovereign power. In particular economists cite the government's power to grant and enforce legal tender status for its favored money, or to specify and enforce the medium for taxation and government expenditures. Here we draw attention to the unusual case of Somalia after the collapse of its national government, where fiat money has retained a positive value through periods without any form of sovereign support. We offer an explanation in terms of historical inertia.
The case for the importance of legal tender powers emphasizes that the government can create a demand for unbacked money by declaring it legal tender for existing debts, thereby compelling creditors to accept it. Some authors use the term "legal tender" (or "exclusive legal tender") to refer to laws that effectively compel acceptance in an even wider set of transactions, including spot transactions and new debt contracts, by forbidding payment in alternative monies. A representative statement comes from Hershel I. Grossman (1991, pp. 329-30) , who in a review essay comments that his "quick reading of monetary history […] suggests that in practice credible sovereign power-specifically, the ability to enforce the legal tender status of fiat money-is necessary to create the expectations that support a viable fiat money." 1 The case for the importance of public receivability similarly emphasizes that a government of sufficient size can create demand for an unbacked money by accepting or requiring its use in tax payments.
2 Abba Lerner (1947, p. 313 ) provides a clear statement:
The modern state can make anything it chooses generally acceptable as money, and thus establish its value quite apart from any connection, even of the most formal kind, with gold or with backing of any kind. It is true that a simple declaration that such and such is money will not do, even if backed with the most convincing constitutional evidence of the state's absolute sovereignty. But if the state is willing to accept the proposed money in payment of taxes and other obligations to itself the trick is done.
By accepting the unbacked money, the government gives the monetary unit a positive value. Others are then able to use the unbacked money to facilitate a wider set of transactions.
There is no disputing that legal tender status or public receivability can enhance the demand for a fiat money and thus may be sufficient to give an unbacked paper money a positive value. But is either measure necessary? A third possibility is that the inertia of historical acceptance is sufficient (Selgin 1994 (Selgin , 2003 Duffy and Ochs 2002) . There is little hope of empirically determining what combination of legal tender status, public receivability, and historical acceptance provides the necessary support to a fiat money's circulation if we limit out attention to monies endowed with all three characteristics.
Fortunately an unusual natural experiment-the disappearance of the Somali state in 1 Grossman was commenting on Wright (1989, 1991) . We consider those and related papers below. 2 The doctrine of chartalism (Knapp 1924; Wray 2000) finds even the historical origin of commodity money in the power to tax. See also Forstater (2006) and Goldberg (2010) .
1991-provides us with the rare opportunity to study a currency with only the third of these three forces present. Unbacked paper Somali shilling notes, as we detail below, continued to circulate at a positive value after the state collapsed. This episode provides evidence that sovereign support is not necessary for the continued circulation of an unbacked paper currency.
How does an unbacked currency survive without sovereign support? We offer the explanation that historical experience with a currency's acceptance can create sufficient "inertia," meaning practices and expectations of ongoing acceptance that provide a strategic focal point for traders and thereby perpetuate themselves. As Duffy and Ochs (2002, p. 637) describe their own experimental findings, "people have formed a (rational)
expectation that it will continue to serve as a medium of exchange and this expectation need not be supported by any property of the object other than the social convention that has emerged from its use in the past." We discuss this idea-that historical acceptance creates a natural focal point or social convention-and compare our view with the widely used search-theoretic random-matching models of currency acceptance associated with Kiyotaki and Wright.
Our argument can be summarized in the following way. The typical trader finds himself in a coordination game with other traders. He may accept a familiar money today, in preference to an unfamiliar money or cumbersome barter, because he found it widely accepted yesterday and knows that his trading partners found it widely accepted yesterday (and they know that he knows, and that he knows that they know that he knows…). Until he sees evidence to the contrary, he expects other traders to follow the same strategy and thus expects the money to be widely accepted tomorrow. To put the strategy the other way around, absent some clear death knell for the money, he has no reason to discontinue acceptance before others do. Inertia carries it forward.
We proceed as follows. Section 1 establishes the historical acceptance of the fiat Somali shilling. Section 2 shows that the Somali shilling continued to circulate in the absence of sovereign support (legal tender status or public receivability). Section 3 offers a theoretical explanation of continued circulation in terms of focal-point inertia, and argues that our explanation is consistent with search-theoretic random-matching models of money as a medium of exchange. Section 4 concludes. : 1960-1991 We briefly review the history of currency acceptance in Somalia between 1960 and 1991. 3 In doing so, we establish that Somali shillings were widely accepted throughout the country for a significant period of time prior to state collapse in 1991. We also show that the design of shilling notes was largely unchanged over the period after 1962. These facts bolster our claim that historical acceptance created a salient focal point.
Historical Acceptance in Somalia
In 1960, British and Italian Somaliland joined to form the Republic of Somalia.
Having previously operated as a currency board issuing gold-redeeemable "somalo" notes, and then as a central bank under Italian administration, the Mogadishu-based In order to facilitate circulation, text on the notes appeared in multiple languages. As a result, these notes might also be known as "scellini" or "shilin Somali." We use the English version, "Somali shilling," which appeared in multiple locations on the front and back of the notes (Symes 2006a, p. 14) . 6 According to Symes (2006a, p. 17) , only the issue date, title of one signatory, and names of signatories changed between the second and third issue. The fluorescent ink security feature was not included in third or fourth issue notes (though the fluorescent thread remained) and the form of decree authorizing (and appearing on) fourth issue notes differs from earlier issues. The latter reflects "a subtle change in Somalia's In 1975, the National Bank of Somalia was renamed the Central Bank of Somalia.
Three years later, the sixth issue was placed into circulation. 8 Of the four denominations printed, 10 and 20 Somali shillings notes were nearly identical to the notes printed four years earlier by the National Bank. The color of 5 denomination notes was changed back from brown to red; and some printed near the end of the issue saw the wildebeest and zebras replaced by a herd of water buffalo. The back image of the 100 denomination note, which had contained a group of women sorting fruit and one woman holding a wheelbarrow, was modified to exclude the woman with the wheelbarrow. Despite political structure" resulting from the success of the Barre regime in October 1969 (p. 17). One further difference affected only the 5 Somali shilling: its color was changed in the fourth issue from red to chocolate brown. Otherwise, the 5, 10, 20, and 100 denomination notes were the same across issues. 7 Somali was predominately a spoken language until the Barre regime adopted the Latin script in October 1971 (Abdullahi 2001, pp. xvii, 71-73) . 8 Symes (2006a, p. 20) refers to these notes as the "first issue," since they were the first issued under the Central Bank of Somalia. We maintain that, at least with respect to note issue, changes at the bank were merely nominal. The degree of similarity with the prior issue attests to this. As such, we refer to these notes as the "sixth issue."
changes taking place at the central bank, the notes are remarkably similar to those previously issued.
Two further issues (called X-and KH-series notes, respectively) occurred in 1980 and 1981. 9 Except for switching the color of ink used for the serial number from black to red in 1980, no substantive changes were made to the look or feel of the notes.
A slight reduction in size for the ninth issue, placed in circulation in 1983, required all notes be redrawn. 10 However, as numismatist Peter Symes (2006a, p. 22) observes, "it often requires a second look to identify the differences between the new notes and the notes they replaced-so similar are the designs." On second glance, 1986, 1987, and 1988. In 1989, the Central Bank of Somalia introduced a 500 Somali shillings note for the first time, prompted by a rising price level and the need to finance fiscal deficits arising from military expenses. As with the 50 Somali shillings note issued six years earlier, the design was quite similar to the other notes in circulation. Fluorescent series 9 The seventh issue (X-series) consisted of 10, 20, and 100 denomination notes; only 20 and 100 denomination notes were printed in the eighth issue (KH-series). 10 The 100 Somali shilling note, for example, was reduced from 165x80 mm to 148x74 mm. 11 Symes (2006a, p. 22) maintains that available features were likely foregone to keep production costs down for the low-valued note.
and serial numbers were incorporated to make the higher denomination note more difficult to counterfeit. As the Barre regime struggled to suppress the revolution, deficits increased and inflation further eroded the value of Somali shillings. The Central Bank introduced a 1000 denomination note in 1990. The 500 Somali shillings-identical to those issued in late 1989-was the only other denomination printed in this eleventh issue. 1. Issue names in parentheses reflect classification system employed by Symes (2006a) . 2. We omit changes in the names of signatories, positions held by signatories, form of decree authorizing notes, title of issuing authority, series identifier, and other items not immediately noticeable to the casual observer.
3. National Bank of Somalia.
When the Barre regime lost power in 1991, the Somali shilling had continuously circulated for nearly thirty years. As Table 1 summarizes, the design of the notes had changed only minimally over this time, with the most substantive changes (arising shortly after Barre took power) occurring more than fifteen years before the state collapsed. We conclude from these facts that the people of Somalia had become (1) quite familiar with Somali shillings notes and (2) accustomed to accepting them in exchange. Historical acceptance, we will argue, created the common beliefs that permitted these notes to circulate long after the sovereign disappeared.
Continued Circulation in Stateless Somalia
In this section, we show that the Somali shilling continued to circulate in the absence of sovereign support (legal tender status or public receivability 
State Collapse
The end of the Somali state has been presented in much more detail elsewhere, and is only briefly described here to establish a start date for the acceptance of the Somali shilling without sovereign backing. In doing so, we reaffirm the widely held opinion that, when the Somali state disappeared, a new government did not replace it.
In January 1991, more than four years after civil war began, then-President Siad
Barre fled the capital city of Mogadishu as it was overrun by the Somali National
Alliance. Barre was nominally replaced by Northern Mogadishu businessman Ali Mahdi
Muhammad. However, the Somali National Alliance, comprised of several clans and subclans, was divided on the issue of who would make a suitable replacement. As a result, the alliance splintered along traditional lines and its groups "quickly fell to fighting one another" (Gregory 1992, p. 34) . By September 1991, as many as twelve clans and subclans vied for power (Fitzgerald 2002, p. 18) . Boutros-Ghali (1999, p. 53),
appointed UN Secretary-General in January 1992, provides a clear statement:
Throughout 1991 Somalia was torn by factional fighting. With no central government, the country fragmented as rival militias fought for food, prestige, and territory. As one of the world's poorest countries, Somalia had little to rely on in time of trouble. Schools closed. There was no electricity. Local government disappeared.
The government of Somalia, which had introduced and supported the Somali shilling, ceased to exist.
By mid-1992, the struggle for power in Somalia largely centered around two 
Continued Acceptance
Those involved with the humanitarian relief effort in Somalia have provided eyewitness testimony that the Somali shilling continued to circulate after the state collapsed. In 1992, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance at USAID devised a plan to sell a portion of food aid to merchants in order to fund NGO projects employing Somalis in more stable areas of the country (Lewis 1992) . Andrew S. Natsios (1997, p. 87-89) , who served as assistant administrator for the Bureau for Food and Humanitarian 12 Although no one to our knowledge denies that Somalia remains a difficult place to live, several studies point to the relative success of Somalia in the post-1991 period. By comparing scores of 18 development indicators, Leeson (2007) finds that Somalia has performed better without a state. Powell et al. (2008) offer evidence that Somalia even improved relative to comparable countries in the region. See also: Nenova (2004), Nenova and Hartford (2004) , Coyne (2006) , Leeson and Boettke (2009) , Leeson and Williamson (2009) , and Coyne and Leeson (2010) .
Assistance at the time, reports that food aid was exchanged for "local currency." Since the Somali shilling continued to be accepted, it was only natural for relief workers making transactions in the area to adopt the local currency. One of the most astounding phenomena of the domestic market is the continued circulation of the old Somali bank notes. The Somali currency has had no central bank to back it up since the bank was destroyed and looted in 1991. Nonetheless, the currency has maintained value, and has floated against other foreign currencies that are traded freely in local markets.
Mubarak goes on to say that "the US dollar has gradually emerged as a backup currency for the Somali shilling," largely due to UN mandates, export proceeds, and remittances from abroad (p. 2031). Drysdale (2001, p. 51) describes the "Mogadishu Bakara currency market" in 1992, "where, in common with banks of computerized sophistication, the Somali shilling floats against foreign currencies at daily transaction rates." On March 31, 1992, for example, US$1 equaled 3,800 Somali shillings (Fitzgerald 2002, p. 18 
Regional Governments in Stateless Somalia
Although Somali shilling notes have circulated continuously since state collapse and, in fact, are still accepted throughout Somalia today, the existence of two regional governments-the Republic of Somaliland and the Puntland State of Somalia-qualifies our claim that these notes have circulated without sovereign support. We address each in turn.
Somaliland
In May 1991, faction leaders primarily from the Issaq clan declared independence in northwest Somalia, creating the Republic of Somaliland. Somaliland has not been officially recognized internationally. However, the government of Somaliland provides national defense, police protection, and issues passports for foreign travel (Bekele 2009 Symes (2006a, pp. 25-29) and Mubarak (1997 Mubarak ( , 2003 . at first because the public already did, rather than the reverse.
Puntland
In August 1998, leaders of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front declared autonomy in northeast Somalia, known today as Puntland. 16 Unlike leaders in 15 Following the period of exchange, the government of Somaliland sold its holdings of Somali shilling notes to businessmen making transactions in Somalia and Ethiopia (Symes 2006b, p. 21) . The sale of notes provides additional evidence that the Somali shilling circulated at a positive market value outside of Somaliland. 16 The SSDF, whose supporters are primarily from the Majerteen clan, was formed in opposition to the Barre regime in the late 1970s.
Somaliland, the SSDF did not establish Puntland in an effort to secede from Somalia. The
Transitional Constitution of Puntland Regional Government declared the territory "an independent integral part of Somalia" with an "obligation to restore and maintain the unity of Somalia on the basis of a Federal System." In terms of restoring order and providing public services, Puntland has been somewhat less successful than neighboring Somaliland.
Although the Puntland administration has been relatively ineffective at governing the territory, it is somewhat more plausible that Puntland has provided important sovereign support for the Somali shilling than that Somaliland has. 
A Theoretical Explanation
Many economists express surprise upon hearing that unbacked Somali shillings continued to circulate after the state collapsed. 17 We argue that such a circulation is entirely consistent with the predictions of well-known models of money as a medium of exchange.
Under the search-theoretic, random matching models of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989 , 1991 ) the bilateral exchange restriction introduces a double coincidence of wants problem a la Jevons (1875) and thereby creates an opportunity for at least one commodity to serve as a commonly accepted medium of exchange. 18 Since all commodities in this environment are consumed, there is no fear of being stuck with something useless: an agent holding a commodity as a medium of exchange will eventually be matched with another agent desiring it for consumption. Accepting fiat money, which exists in the model space as a fixed endowment that no player type produces or consumes (i.e., it is intrinsically useless), is a very different matter. An agent faces the possibility of being stuck with fiat money forever since, by definition, no one consumes the intrinsically useless good. Although certain specifications yield steady-state 17 They are perhaps extrapolating from the worthlessness of the Confederate States of America dollar at the conclusion of the US Civil War, a currency repudiated by the victorious Union and replaced by the US dollar. In Somalia, by contrast, there was no new national sovereign, and no other party able to force a replacement currency into nationwide use. 18 By endogenizing the matching process, Wright (2001, 2002) confirm that the bilateral exchange restriction drives the result.
equilibria where fiat money circulates as the commonly accepted medium of exchange, the environment is generally characterized by multiple equilibria. Thus, whether fiat money attains a positive value and circulates depends crucially on the beliefs of agents. If everyone believes others will accept fiat money, it will circulate. But if no one believes others will accept fiat money, it will not circulate. The success or failure of fiat money in this formulation is a self-fulfilling prophecy. As such, sovereign support is not strictly necessary to generate acceptance.
Government Support in the Kiyotaki-Wright Environment
Although the existence of equilibria where fiat money is accepted in the KiyotakiWright environment does not require sovereign support, the prevalence of government in the modern era arguably warrants its inclusion. Aiyagari and Wallace (1997) and Li and Wright (1998) introduce government transaction policies into the Kiyotaki-Wright framework. Specifically, they classify G agents in the population of size N as government agents. These agents are randomly matched and employ trading strategies like other agents. Whereas non-government agents choose individual trading strategies to maximize their own private utility, government agents act under instructions that specify their trading strategies. In such an environment a sufficiently big government is capable of determining the commonly accepted medium of exchange by insuring that a large enough share of agents will accept that medium. "How big is sufficiently big," Li and Wright (1998, p. 312) explain, "depends on several factors, including properties of the money, the presence of alternative means of payment, and other aspects of policy." Aiyagari and Wallace (1997, p. 11) 
This case is fundamentally the same as those proposed by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) , where no government support is necessary for the intrinsically useless item to serve as money in equilibrium. Should a government happen to exist at t = 0 but disappear, x would continue to circulate, as the previously existing government is unnecessary for its initial and continued acceptance. Like Case 2, the minimum size of government required to initially establish x as money in Case 3 is greater than zero. However, Case 3 differs in that zero government support is required for x to continue as money after it has gained general circulation for a time. In other words, government is necessary to establish x as a commonly accepted medium of exchange, but unnecessary to perpetuate continued acceptance.
Of these three cases, only Case 2 is inconsistent with the historical episode of In Case 3 min(g t * ) changes through time. We need to explain why it changes if we are to offer an analytically satisfying account of the Somali experience. We propose that historical acceptance can plausibly explain the change, and now turn to spelling out how it does so. In brief, we argue that historical acceptance reduces the need for government to sustain a money indefinitely by providing a basis for self-sustaining transactor beliefs.
Historical Acceptance and the Beliefs of Agents
Consider the beliefs of agents in the Kiyotaki-Wright models described above.
Agents will accept fiat money if and only if they believe that others will do likewise (Kiyotaki and Wright 1991, p. 216) . Hence, the emergence of a fiat money in the models depends crucially on the ability of agents to form convergent beliefs about the beliefs held by others. As Duffy (2001, p. 297) observes, "agents almost certainly do not begin a process of social interaction with equilibrium beliefs but must adjust their strategies to their evolving historical experiences within a given trading regime." Thus it is important to consider "how play evolves when agents are placed in the Kiyotaki-Wright environment." 21 Furthermore, if historical cases are to be considered, the simple 21 Experimental studies with human subjects in the Kiyotaki-Wright environment generally support the hypothesis that beliefs converge toward their equilibrium states (Brown 1996; Ochs 1999, 2002; Duffy 2001 ). However, human subjects are reluctant to accept items with higher storage costs, even when doing so would significantly decrease the number of periods one must hold the item before being able to Kiyotaki-Wright environment (with three consumption goods and one intrinsically useless item) must be extended to include many more goods and presumably an infinite number of intrinsically useless items. 22 In light of the existing experimental evidence, we
should not assume humans acting in this complex Kiyotaki-Wright environment are initially endowed with equilibrium beliefs but rather that they acquire beliefs through time as they interact with others.
23
Analyzing acceptance in terms of belief acquisition provides another way of understanding the role sovereign support can play in establishing a transactions medium.
In addition to establishing demand for the supported money, and thereby giving it a positive value, sovereign support in the form of public receivability or legal tender status creates a focal point on which individuals can coordinate. Creating a focal point is crucial because the network property of money-the payoff associated with any particular medium of exchange increasing in the number of players coordinating on that particular monetary unit-creates a large-scale coordination game in choosing which potential money or monies to accept.
Historical acceptance can play a similar role in creating a focal point. Observing the acceptance of x as money by others yesterday, it is reasonable for an agent to infer, in the absence of disconfirming information, that those others will accept x today. In this respect, our perspective is similar to that of Selgin (1994 Selgin ( , 2003 , who considers the implications of adaptive learning for transitioning from barter or commodity money to trade for one's consumption good (Duffy 1998, pp. 18-22) . Other attempts at considering monetary exchange in the lab include McCabe (1989) , Marimon and Sunder (1993 , 1995 , Bernasconi and Kirchkamp (2000) , Camera et al. (2003) , Deck et al. (2006) , Hens et al. (2007) , and Camera and Casari (2010) . Duffy (2010) provides a survey. 22 In their primer on the search-theoretic approach to money, Rupert et. al (2000) allow for a greater variety of goods. 23 Marimon et al. (1990) , Basçi (1999) , Staudinger (1998) , and Duffy (2001) 
Conclusion
The case of Somalia indicates that sovereign support-in the form of legal tender laws or public receivability-is not a necessary condition for the continued circulation of fiat money. Following state collapse, Somali shillings continued to circulate as a commonly accepted medium of exchange. After considering the potential role of regional governments, including the Republic of Somaliland and the Puntland State of Somalia, we find that Somali shillings continued to circulate without sovereign support at least from January 1991 to May 1991 and, again, from January 1995 to August 1998. We suggest that it was the inertia provided by historical acceptance that allowed stateless Somali shillings to continue circulating. Somalis had no reason to stop accepting the familiar money at a positive value before others did, so they continued to accept it.
